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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALL THE FACTS OF WHICH APPELLEES DID NOT TAKE ISSUE ARE 
ADMITTED. 
The Appellees did not take exception to the majority of the facts stated by 
the Appellant in his Brief and therefore apparently agree with the statement of 
those facts. 
A. Those facts to which the Appellees did not take exception: 
In Appellant's Brief, Appellant set forth a detailed statement of facts 
which was supported by specific references to the record. The Appellees 
did not properly take exception to any of the statement of facts. Appellant 
1 
urges that the fair assessment of Appellees' statement of facts would 
demonstrate that Appellees do not disagree with the majority of 
Appellant's statement of facts. With few exceptions, which are treated 
later in a subparagraph of this point, it could be said that Appellees not 
only did not take exception to Appellant's statement of facts, but also 
admitted the statements to be true when they make reference to the same 
facts but attempt in their statement of facts to make arguments in 
mitigation of those admitted facts. 
The arguments which Appellees improperly make in their alleged 
statement of facts in most instances do not mitigate against the facts as 
they exist. 
Aside from the problem that Appellees' statement of facts contain 
inaccurate and non-relevant facts, Appellees simply do not refute the 
facts with recitation made by Appellant in Appellant's statement of facts. 
B. Those facts to which Appellees apparently take exception: 
Although Appellees do not directly attack the factual recitation 
made by the Appellant, Appellees, by the nature of their statement of 
facts, apparently claim that Appellant failed to marshal all of the evidence. 
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POINT II 
APPELLEES FAIL TO PROVIDE ANY RELEVANT, CONFLICTING TESTIMONY 
OR FAIL TO PROVIDE WHAT RELEVANT, CRUCIAL AND INCRIMINATING 
EVIDENCE WAS WITHHELD. 
A. In Point I of Appellees' Brief, Appellees assert that Appellant failed 
to marshal all of the evidence in support of his findings. Appellant challenged 
paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law in that Appellees "had 
continuing expectations that Defendant [Appellant] would return to the leased 
premises." However, Appellees fail establish what conflicting testimony or what 
relevant, crucial, and incriminating evidence was withheld. There is simply no 
evidence to support the trial court's finding that Appellees had a continuing 
expectation that Appellant would return to the leased premises. 
B. In Point II of Appellees' Brief, Appellees assert that three (3) items 
from Jones' testimony gave the trial court the basis for a finding that "Jones 
[Appellee] always had the expectation that Arambel [Appellant] would return to 
the leased premises . . . ." Items 2 and 3 deal with the contract for the purchase 
of the cows, which contract was completed prior to the events effecting the 
surrender and termination of the lease or the abandonment of the premises by 
Appellant1. Item 1 was properly addressed in Appellant's statement of facts (See 
paragraph 5 of Appellant's Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law). 
1
 Neither the trial court's concluding statements (T. 284, 285), Memorandum Decision, 
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, nor the Judgment & Decree provide any mention 
as to the contract for the purchase of the cows, such statements not being relevant to the 
issues before the court and the lease agreement. 
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C. In Point III of Appellees' Brief Appellees agaii i fail to establish how 
Appellant failed to marshal his evidence. Appellees claim there was a "course of 
clealii igs betweei i lot les [Appellee] and Arambel [Appellant] foi the mutual use 
of the facilities, equipment and tools . . . made it clear that the leased premises 
were available to Arambel [Appellant] at all times2." 
Contrary to this assertion, it is undisputed that: 
1. The Defendant/Appellant unequivocally surrendered the premises 
to the Plaintiffs/Appellees as evidenced b> abai icioi 11 i ler it of tl le ( )i en lises 
in September 1991 (T. 88); Defendant/Appellant's failure to pay rent in 
July 1992 (1. 32 - 34, 104); r iotifie< I PI; lii itiffs/ Af >j »ei!ec is ii i a letti = n date* 1 • 
October 8, 1992, of Defendant/Appellant's intent to abandon the premises 
.'mil iPiriii!!,]ii!M'« (hi* lease ay ieemef i l ( I HO, >)|, Defendant's Exhibit #21) . 
2. The Plaintiffs/Appellees exercised immediate and absolute 
domin inn MI ir11:cnill nl ovoi the premises ( i •- • • — i 1nQ 1 n c 
106, 140-146). 
3. Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones testified that after 
Defendant/Appellant vaca ted tl ie premises, Plaii itiff/Appellee Noi * al 
Jones placed twenty-six (26) head of cattle in the corrals and feed yards, 
Neither the trial court's concluding comments, Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact & 
Conclusion of Law, nor the Judgment & Decree make any mention as to the past course of 
dealings in support of alleged findings that Appellees had a reasonable expectation that 
Appellant would return to the leased premises, or that the leased premises were available 
to Appellant at al! times. 
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placed hay into the shed, placed his own personal farm equipment into 
the commodity sheds, and used the farm machinery, including the grain 
chopper, Ford tractor and manure box, and Knight spreader for his own 
use and benefit (T. 38 -41, 97 -100). 
4. Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones sold the tenant house to Randy and 
Karen Jones (T. 100 -102; 145, 146). 
5. From and after Defendant/Appellant's surrender of the possession 
of the premises, Defendant/Appellant never attempted to retake 
possession, dominion or control over the premises surrendered (T. 90, 
91; Defendant's Exhibit #21). 
6. Plaintiffs/Appellees made no effort whatsoever to relet the 
premises, and Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones acknowledged that he 
made no effort to release the premises to anyone else, and that he didn't 
want to release the premises to anyone else although he was contacted 
by three (3) parties who were interested in leasing the premises 
immediately after Defendant/Appellant vacated the premises (T. 101, 
107-109). 
7. Plaintiffs/Appellees never introduced any evidence to demonstrate 
an election of the remedy, but the evidence demonstrated that 
Plaintiffs/Appellees' conduct, as a matter of law, constituted an election to 
terminate the lease agreement. 
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I - ' - * ' M •• •: i* t l ie facilities, 
such does not translate into a reasonable expectation that the leased premises 
were aiailph'" (<> 'Ippellanl ,il .ill i'in»»s I he ubove-stated items clearly 
establish, by Appellees' own actions, that they did not have a reasonable 
expectation that Appellant would return to the leased premises. 
POINT III 
IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT APPELLEES FAILED TO MAKE REASONABLE 
STEPS TO MITIGATE THEIR LOSSES, WHICH ORDINAP" Y MEANS A 
LANDLORD MUST SEEK TO RELET THE PREMISES. 
Appellees asset that the continuing "expectation that Arambel [Appellant] 
\vot ltd i eti II i i to tf ie leased pi ei i lises was i easoi lable,' ai id, for tl' lat reason, failed 
to relet the premises thereby mitigating their damages. Such notion flies in the 
face of 11 Reed v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896 
(Utah 1989). 
Appellees state four (4) items which would negate Appellees' 
responsibility to seek to relet the premises after bread l of the lease agi eei T lei it. 
However, items 2, 3, and 4 are not relevant and deal with the contract for 
pi ir c I iase of the co\ \ s, i lot tl ie lease, wl iict t was con i ipleted pi i1 :»!" I: :> the events 
effecting the surrender and termination, and before the abandonment of the 
leased premises3. Item 1 deals vvitl i tl te i ei i io\ » al c f ! laylage in December 199? 
3
 The trial court did not mention the contract for purchase of the cows in its closing remarks 
or Memorandum Decision, nor was this made a part of the Findings of Fact & Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment & Decree. 
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The trial court found that Appellees failed to take adequate steps to mitigate 
damages after July 1, 1993 (1st Memorandum Decision). Appellant testified that 
the haylage was removed in December 1991 (T. 279, 280). 
A. The overwhelming weight of the evidence provides that Appellees 
did not have a reasonable expectation that Appellant would return. 
The Defendant/Appellant unequivocally surrendered the premises 
by abandonment of the premises in September 1991 (T. 88); 
Defendant/Appellant's failure to pay rent in July 1992 (T. 32 - 34, 104); 
notified Plaintiffs/Appellees in a letter dated October 8, 1992, of 
Defendant/Appellant's intent to abandon the premises and terminate the 
lease agreement (T. 90, 91; Defendant's Exhibit #21). 
Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones testified that after 
Defendant/Appellant vacated the premises, Plaintiff/Appellee Norval 
Jones placed twenty-six (26) head of cattle in the corrals and feed yards, 
placed hay into the shed, placed his own personal farm equipment into 
the commodity sheds, and used the farm machinery, including the grain 
chopper, Ford tractor and manure box, and Knight spreader for his own 
use and benefit (T. 38 -41, 97 -100). 
Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones sold the tenant house to Randy and 
Karen Jones (T. 100 -102; 145, 146). 
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I he ovorwfIHIIIIIIK) vvoii|ltt nf (he evidence provides that Appellees 
knew of Appellant's abandonment of the premises by September 1, 1991, but 
fjfedB't) mil 1 11nix|,id* their damages. 
Plaintiff/Appellee Nerval Jones acknowledged that he made 110 effoi f to 
release the premises to anyone else, and that he didn't want to release 
the premises to anyone else althougl 11 ie wns c *ot itnrt* »d ! iy tl nfH" I M 
parties who were interested in leasing the premises immediately after 
Defendant/Appellant: vacated HIP piPiiiises ij 1 in 1 li ir n)Hj. 
Appellees' alleged reasonable expectations that Appellant would 
retun t In Ihp pi onuses WPIP finally iininasmiMble Given that Appellees 
did not intend and never did attempt to mitigate their damages, it was 
ei i oi foi tl ie l:i ial cc >i n I: to award one (I) additional year of rental from July 
1992 to July 1993. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT MARSHALED ALL OF THE RELEVANT EVIDENC ^ « 
FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE. 
Appellees take exception that Appellant failed to marshal all of his 
evidence which Appellees attempt to demonstrate tlir o if their 
own statement of facts. However, Appellees' statement of facts, in many 
instances, is not supported by the recoid -inh heals with (a<.K nnl nelf-vniit or 
material to the issues before this court, and, in some instances, is an inaccurate 
i epi esentatio-
 t. $. 
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Appellees' and Appellant's statement of facts do not contain numbered 
paragraphs, but, nonetheless, Appellant will treat the paragraphs as though they 
were numbered and respond to the paragraph numbers as follows: 
Paragraph 2: This paragraph is not relevant as to the issues before this 
court. However Appellant's statement of facts sets forth the adequate facts to 
determine this is an agricultural lease of dairy facilities. (See paragraphs 1 - 5 of 
Appellant's statement of facts). 
Paragraph 3: This paragraph is not relevant as to the issues before this 
court. However, Appellant's statement of facts sets forth adequate facts to 
determine this is an agricultural lease of dairy facilities (See paragraphs 1 - 5 of 
Appellant's statement of facts). The second sentence in paragraph 3 is not an 
accurate statement and not part of the record. 
Paragraph 4: The first sentence of paragraph 4 dealing with the lease is 
adequately set forth in Appellant's recitation of facts (See paragraphs 1 - 5 of 
Appellant's statement of facts). The remainder of this paragraph is not relevant 
as to the issues before this court in that the contract for the sale of cows had 
been completed (T. 27 - 31 )4. The trial court's Memorandum Decision, Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment make no mention as to the 
contract of sale of cows. 
In June 1991, the transaction on the purchase of the cows was completed. Appellant 
stopped paying rent in July 1992. 
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Paragraphs 5 -8 : These paragraphs are not relevant or material as to the 
issues before this court. The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, makes no mention of these 
facts. 
Paragraph 9: This paragraph does not accurately characterize the 
testimony of the haylage. Appellant testified that the silage in 1991 was placed 
on his property rather than on the leased premises (T. 24). It is a question of 
whether it is relevant and material. The silage was removed about the same 
time as the lease payments ceased (T. 32 - 34, 104). The first sentence is not 
an accurate representation. The parties entered into a lease agreement on the 
21st day of August, 1989 (T. 20 - 22, 248, 284). Appellant left the premises in 
September 1991 (T. 88), and Appellee stopped receiving rent in July 1992 
(T. 32 - 34, 104). In November 1991, the Appellees placed hay into the sheds 
(T. 38-41,97-100) . 
Paragraph 10: This paragraph is not relevant in that the contract of the 
purchase of the cows had been completed and is not in issue with the lease 
agreement (T. 27 - 31). The lease remained in effect when the contract for 
purchase of the cows was completed prior to the events affecting the surrender 
and termination of the lease or failure to mitigate damages after breach of the 
lease (T. 27-31). 
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Paragraph 11: This paragraph is not relevant in that the contract on the 
purchase of the cows was completed (T. 27 -31). The lease and the relevant 
terms and conditions therein had been set forth in Appellant's Brief (See 
paragraphs 1-5 of Appellant's statement of facts). 
Paragraph 12: This paragraph contains the facts in Appellant's Brief (See 
paragraphs 1 - 5 of Appellant's statement of facts). 
Paragraph 13: This paragraph contains the facts in Appellant's Brief (See 
paragraphs 5 - 7 of Appellant's statement of facts). Appellees make a great deal 
about haylage (very questionable to relevance that was on Appellant's premises. 
This issue was not material as to the trial court's Memorandum Decision, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment). However, Appellant's 
testimony states that the haylage was removed the same year that it was 
delivered in 1991. Mr. Arambel testified: 
Question: When was the haylage removed? 
Answer: By myself. Yes. 
Question: When was it removed? 
Answer: Every year it was fed out and paid for as we went through the 
season. (T. 279 - 280) 
The Appellee did not receive payments beginning in July 1992, the 
alleged breach of lease. For that reason, haylage was not even relevant. 
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Paragraph 14: This paragraph is not an accurate representation of the 
facts and is not supported by the record. The first sentence of paragraph 14 is 
not relevant or material as to the issues before this court. The second sentence 
of paragraph 14 is inaccurate in that the record did not state that Arambel 
allowed Jones to use the corrals free of charge for the summer of 1990 
(T. 36). The third sentence of paragraph 14 is immaterial as to the issues before 
this court. 
Paragraph 15: Appellant's statement of facts sets forth adequate similar 
facts in Appellant's Brief (See paragraphs 5 and 6 of Appellant's statement of 
facts). The first sentence of paragraph 15 is inaccurate in that the record did not 
state: (1) there were three (3) opportunities to lease the property for short 
periods of time, and (2) that Todd Davis just wanted to milk the cows on the 
property until he sold them. The correct recitation of the record is as follows: 
Question: Mr. Jones, when Mr. Arambel moved off the premises in June 
of 1992, thereafter did you make any effort to re-lease the premises to 
anybody else? 
Answer: No. 
Question: You made no effort whatsoever? 
Answer: I had people contact me wanting to lease those premises. At 
one time, an individual contacted me about leasing the premises and I 
stated that Mr. Arambel and myself were in litigation and that I, it was my 
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opinion and my understanding that he still held the lease and that I could, 
I had no opportunity to let the use of the premises go to anyone else. 
Question: Alright. Can you tell me how many people contacted you 
about releasing the premises? 
Answer: I can think of three. 
Question: Can you name those individuals, those dates and times, that 
contacted you? 
Answer: I cannot name the dates and times. I can, the one individual, it 
was shortly after Mike had moved to Hyrum so that he would move in 
October or November. His name would have been Todd Davis. He 
indicated that he was interested in leasing it and talked to Mike about 
that, and, I informed him that as far as I understood Mike still should be 
paying the lease and still should have the premises at his option. So, I 
refused his offer. Or I refused - - He didn't make an offer. I just refused to 
let him lease it. 
The other individual was Goodyear, two brothers who were 
neighbors approached me and wanted to lease it. They wanted to let 
them come and operate the premises for a period of four or five or six 
months until they could get things going, and they wanted to pay a certain 
amount of money which they never indicated what it would be. I felt this 
was acceptable (T. 107 -109). 
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Paragraph 16: This paragraph contains the facts presented in Appellant's 
Brief. Additionally, paragraph 16 is inaccurate and is not cited to the record "that 
Jones never took any action to terminate the lease." 
Paragraph 17: This paragraph contains the relevant facts in Appellant's 
Brief (See paragraph 8 of Appellant's statement of facts). The last sentence in 
paragraph 17 is inaccurate in that it states that "Arambel never repaired those 
items or equipment." This is not supported by the record. 
Paragraph 18: This paragraph contains relevant facts in Appellant's Brief 
(See paragraphs 5 and 6 of Appellant's statement of facts). 
Paragraph 19: This paragraph contains relevant facts in Appellant's Brief 
(See paragraphs 14-16 of Appellant's statement of facts). However, paragraph 
19 also contains facts that are not relevant to the issues before the court, 
particularly failure to keep the improvements on the premises in good order, and 
damage to the leased premises beyond normal wear. Appellant's record does 
provide that the Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law contained a statement 
that Appellee had a continuing expectation that Appellant would return to the 
leased premises. 
Appellant's Brief sets forth all the relevant and material facts as to the 
issues before the court, i.e. the lease. Appellant's facts are not rebutted by 
Appellees, and Appellant urges that Appellant's statement of facts provide an 
adequate statement of all the issues before this court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For those reasons above, Appellant has revealed all crucial and 
incriminating evidence. Appellees provide no conflicting, relevant testimony as it 
relates to this lease agreement. Given the nature of the facts, this court should 
grant the relief as set forth in the original Brief of the Appellant. 
DATED this j/* day of September, 1996. 
At • ) 
Gregory SKabelund 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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